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In the constitutional case of Gong Lum v. Rice (1927), the United States
Supreme Court, composed entirely of Bok Guey (whites), adjudged Hon Yen
(Chinese) to be in the same social classification as Lo Mok (blacks). 1 The case,
which pertained to "racially" segregated schools, reveals the problematic of law,
race, and ethnicity.
The Supreme Court ' s decision permitted the state of Mississippi to define
Martha Lum, a Chinese American, as a member of the "colored races" so that
"white" schools could remain segregated. The essential meaning of American
ethnicity was, to a large degree, revealed by this convergence of law and race as
ideological constructs reflecting real social relations in the second decade of the
twentieth century.
This paper will attempt to explicate this convergence in examining Gong Lum
v. Rice by using critical legal theory.2 The four basic concepts within critical
legal theory are:
1. Legal ideology and legal institutions reflect the material interests of the
dominating classes .
2. Ideological forms and/or juridic concepts express the consciousness and
world view of those whose hands are on the controls of the "blind insensate
machine of law."3
3. The ideological form helps in the structuring of mass consciousness, helps

in reproducing social relationships and their material base, while simultaneously
obscuring society ' s true formation.
4. Law functions within the Gramscian concept of hegemony-that it is a
relatively autonomous ideological form which functions to lessen and dilute
social antagonisms by "assuring people that their particular conscience can be
subordinated, must be subordinated, to the collective judgement of society."4
Antonio Gramsci, the noted Italian social theorist, developed the idea of
hegemony to explain how domination is maintained, in part, by the ideology of
law . For Gramsci, the law legitimates coercive society by veiling the fact that
coercion exists at all. The law does this by persuading mass society that
"individual rights" within the structure of "formal legal equality" hold out
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"justice" as an end result of the "procedural rights" of due process while actually
m aintaining the status quo of inequality with the indeterminacy of judge-made
decisions. The impression that these decisions are made by a neutral, autonomous,
judicial "oracle" gives the mass society the illusion that such mediatory processes
are the best that one can hope for in alleviating an unjust situation. The
hegemonic function of the law can be clearly seen when racial antagonism is
mediated by "closeted" white racist justices who hide their racism behind the
"objective deliberative" process of a court hearing and neutral principles of law
that are interpreted to maintain white domination over black, or over brown,
yellow, or red. Legitimation and the lessening of racial antagonism have
occurred when the "losers" return to their communities to await the next
opportunity to litigate another "test case" so that their formal rights will, one day,
be recognized by law 's "majestic rights consciousness."
The concept of hegemony as well as the other dimensions of critical legal
theory are recognizable variables in the case involving Martha Lum and the state
of Mississippi . Separate, but never equal , as established by Southern "state
rights" legislative activity following the validating 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson
decision, was the precedent that Chief Justice William Howard Taft, speaking for
an unanimous Court, used against Martha Lum in his decision:
This case then reduces itself to the question of whether a state
can be said to afford a child of Chinese ancestry born in this
country, and citizen of the United States, the equal protection
of the laws by the opportunity for a common school education
in a school which receives only colored children of the brown ,
yellow o r black races . . . we think that i t i s the same question
which has been many times decided to be within the
constitutional power of the state legislature to settle without
intervention of the federal courts under the Federal Constitu
tion.s
"The Lotuses Among the Magnolias"6 responded to this decision by creating
their own schools with their own Chinese American teachers. This was done to
secure their ethnic identity, to prevent their children from attending the black
schools of inferior quality, and to maintain their interstitial niche, via
accomodationism, between the ruling whites and the servile class composed of
African Americans.
This case and the Mississippi Chinese ' s response reveal problems in the
universal applicability of critical legal theory but also demonstrate its utility. The
case demonstrates that: 1) legal ideology, i.e., federalism, supported the world
view and interests of the Southern ruling class in keeping with the infamous
Compromise of 1877; 2) separate but equal was an ideological form that helped
solidify the material basis of society but could not obscure its reality; and 3) law
did not function within Gramscian hegemony in structuring a social formation
which legitimated classifications of color, race, and ethnicity as defined by those
whose hands were on the sensate machine of law because the Chinese saw
through the legal veil.
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Applying critical legal studies to history is highly problematic. The problems
of interpreting and bringing meaning to human political activity can be a
researcher 's most difficult task. However, much of twentieth century race
relations can be explicated by examining the consequential history of Recon
struction and how racialistic federalism evolved. This development ultimately
led to Martha Lum and to a confirmation of the fruitfulness of using this theory,
adjusting for its limitations, as a tool of historical analysis.
If the Civil War was the "irrepressible conflict, " then the Compromise of
1877 could be rightly termed the inevitable reconciliation. The contradictions
within America's capitalist and slave economies had brought about the Civil
War. It would be the American philosophical belief in white supremacy that
would bring about "Reunion " under a racialistic federalism.
The events that led to the Compromise were brought about by the determination
of white Southerners to maintain their way of life . They resorted to a type of
guerrilla warfare which included fraud, intimidation, and murder to re-establish
their own control over the state governments, which were then in the hands of
black Republicans, Northern carpetbaggers, and Southern scalawags. The
implementation of "nigra legislation" by the federal government made the South
even more determined to resist. They saw the 1 3th, 1 4th, and 1 5th Amendments
and subsequent civil rights statutes as the main threat to the Southern status quo
of black subserviency and white supremacy. This threat was exacerbated in
states such as South Carolina, Mississippi , and Louisiana, where the freedman
was densely populated, and in some "Black Belt" counties where they were in
the majority.
But the crucial factor that brought about the Compromise was the reality that
many Northern whites, prior to the Civil War, went along with their Southern
counterparts in looking upon peoples of African descent as an inferior race
doomed to the lowest position in white "civilized" society. This is the fundamental
reason why racialist federalism could develop as a result of the Compromise of
1 877. Before the Civil War, many Northern states had preventive statutes on the
quasi-free African ' s right to vote. Jim Crow existed as a de facto norm in
Northern society in the years preceding the Civil War. The Northern "Negro"
was segregated from the cradle to the grave.? The Compromise of 1877, between
the Republican and Democratic parties, was precipitated by the disputed Hayes
Tilden presidential election of 1 876. Through a series of quasi-secret meetings
and discussions, known as the "Wormley B argain," the parties negotiated
reciprocal promises. 8
This white supremacist rapprochement rested on Northern promises and
Southern hopes. On March 2, 1877, Hayes was formally announced the winner
of the presidential election . Within a short period, Hayes withdrew the federal
troops and put an official end to Radical Reconstruction . He also appointed
Senator David Key of Tennessee as Postmaster General. But other hopes and
promises went unfulfilled. Southerners did not deliver enough votes to elect the
Republican James A. Garfield as the Speaker of the House, and the Republicans
did not deliver enough votes to pass the promised Texas and Pacific Railroad bill .
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In the end,the North resigned political control of the South (racialistic federal
ism) to the Democratic party while retaining for itself control of national
economic policies.9
The role of law (constitutional and "lynch ") and the Supreme Court were vital
in making the Compromise effective. One basic assumption of critical legal
theory is that legal ideology,in this case federalism,supports the world view and
interests of ruling classes. On its face the concept of federalism seeks,as a check
and as a balance,to restrain power aggrandizement. Power is divided between
state and national government. The convergence of legal ideology and racial
ideology which supported the world view and interests of the white ruling classes
of both North and South can be clearly demonstrated by examining the Supreme
Court cases that laid the judicial precedents for Gong Lum v. Rice. The Supreme
Court decisions in the Slaughter House Cases (1872), US v. CruikshankD 875),
Virginia v. R eeves (1880), Pace v. Alabama (1882), US v. Harris (1883),
Cumming v. County Board of Education (1889), Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and
Berea College v. Kentucky (1908)10 solidified a type of racial federalism that
permitted the North to rid itself of the "Negro Question " by giving the South
states rights powers which it used to reduce the African American:
to a despairing second-class citizenship: voteless in the South;
helpless in the face of constant and brutal aggression; ind icted
by all white grand juries and convicted by all-white trial juries;
denied access to places of public accommodation; represented
in public office by those whose very elections were dependent
on their promises to white voters to double and redouble his
disabilities; forced to scrounge and cadge for education;
segregated in every phase of life; . . . with no place to turn for
redress of his grievances except to the Court that had approved
the devices used to reduce him to his helpless and almost
hopeless degradation. I I
In the Slaughter House Cases, Justice S amuel F. Miller, speaking for the
majority, emphasized that the 14th Amendment was not intended to change the
federal system by bringing civil rights under the purview of national citizenship.
This case relegated the fundamental rights of African Americans to the white
supremacists in the states rights area of the American South.
The culmination of Slaughter House and the cases that followed was in Plessy
v. Ferguson (1896).12 In this case the legal principle of "separate but equal" was
established. The Court stated that law is just when it follows "the established
usages, customs and traditions of the people." The Southern custom of working
Negroes with the lash, the tradition of segregating them in inferior and unhealthy
domiciles, and the use of lynch law to break the spirit of black resistance were
consistent with northern interests at this point in time, for the North was
hard at work building railroads, spawning corporations,
winning the West, creating great fortunes, welcoming hordes
of immigrants from Europe to do the necessary labor-and
quite willing to resign the Negro to the tender mercies of the
South.13
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The case demonstrates that the ideology of race and legal discourse combined
to explain how the status quo of white supremacy and black subserviency would
be maintained by rule oflaw. Rule oflaw would help the Southerners coerce their
labor force into submission, for the purpose of exploiting it to meet the material
interests of those who controlled the "lengthening shadow of slavery." This case
and other labor-related peonage cases helped solidify the material basis of a
structure of social relations that was based on white supremacy . 14 The develop
ment of the NAACP ' s campaign to overturn these racialistic case decisions in the
early twentieth century indicated that "separate but equal" was an ideological
form that helped to contour social relations but could not act hegemonic ally to
obscure its racist reality. Justice Harlan, who dissented in the Plessy case, said
it best: "The thin disguise of equal accommodations for passengers . . . will not
mislead anyone nor atone for the wrong this day done . " 1 5 Gramscian hegemony
did not lessen nor dilute social antagonisms, nor did it assure people, black
people, that their particular interests, such as freedom and equality, should be
subordinated to the collective and immoral judgments of a white supremacist
society. This society and particular classes within had their hands on the controls
of the clear-eyed sensate machine of law. The type of racist society legitimized
by the US Supreme Court was totally unacceptable to Americans of minority
ethnicity (African Americans, Chicanos-Latinos, Native Americans, and those
of Asiatic origins). Their respective mass movements of resistance demonstrated
a deep disenchantment with an America predicated on racist ideology and racist
law. I6
The coercive dimensions of law, rarely discussed in conjunction with law ' s
ideological force, became a prominent, primary , and public weapon in breaking
the back of black labor' s resistance. Between 1 889 and 1 922, approximately
3436 people were lynched in this country, the majority of whom were "recalci
trant Negroes. " 17 "Judge Lynch" delegitimized whatever was left of the law ' s
mask o f ritual, magic, and truth. The popular form o f the ideology o f race that was
not so subtly hidden in legal discourse was expressed by such American
luminaries as Thomas Dixon, Governor James Vardaman of Mississippi, and
Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina. The novelist Dixon (the 1 9 1 5 movie
Birth afa Nation was based on his writings) noted, "My deliberate opinion of the
negro is that he is not worth hell-room. If I were the devil I would not let him in
hell.... " On another occasion Dixon thundered: "Education! Can you change

the color of [his] skin, the kink of his hair, the bulge of his lips, the spread of his
nose, or the beat of his heart with a spelling book? The negro is a human donkey. "
Governor Vardaman continued b y emphasizing that " I a m opposed t o Negro
voting [and] it matters not what his advertised moral and mental qualifications
may be. I am just as opposed to Booker T. Washington as a voter, with all of his
Anglo-Saxon reinforcements, as I am to the coconut-headed, chocolate-colored
typical little coon Andy Dotson, who blacks my shoes every morning. Neither
is fit to perform the supreme function of citizenship." Senator Tillman closed this
circle of thought by crying out: "Money spent for the maintenance of public
schools for Negroes is robbery of the white man and a waste upon negroes . It does
him no good, but it does him harm." 1 8
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It was this ideological, institutional, and historical milieu that the first
Chinese faced when they arrived in Mississippi between 1869 and 1877.
S outhern planters recruited "coolie" labor as an alternative to recalcitrant black
labor imbued with the independent air of freedom and equality. The Vicksburg
Times confirmed this recruitment rationale by arguing that "Emancipation has
spoiled the negro, and carried him away from fields of agriculture. Our prosperity
depends entirely upon the recovery of lost ground, and we therefore say let the
Coolies come, and we will take the chance of Christianizing them. " 1 9 In further
analyzing planter motivation, Powell Clayton, Governor of Arkansas, noted that
"Undoubtedly the underlying motive for this effort to bring in Chinese laborers
was to punish the negro for having abandoned the control from his old master,
and to regulate the conditions of his employment and the scales of wages to be
paid him. "2 0
The importation of Chinese into the American South was consistent with the
importation of Chinese labor into the plantation system of the West Indies after
abolition. B oth regional ruling classes were suspicious as to whether the ex-slave
would work without the "benefit" of the lash. Chinese labor came into a type of
social relations in which its status and the ideology of that status were
predetermined by the traditions, customs, and institutional usages of three
hundred years of black and white relationships. Because of this salient fact, the
development of Chinese life in the Mississippi Delta would be contoured by the
proper relationships between predetermined superior and inferior "races."
The period in which the Chinese were used as replacement labor, with a legal
status comparable to the freedman, was brief. With the Compromise of 1 877,
S outhern planters stopped the deliberate recruitment of coolie labor. Black
resistance was broken by constitutional law and by lynch law, embodied in such
terrorist groups as the Ku Klux Klan, the White Line, and the Knights of the
White Camelias. But before the planters returned to blacks as a basis for their
laboring class, it was obvious that some planters were quite pleased with coolie
labor. In 1 870, the Bolivar Times reported that "Messrs. Ferris and Estell, who
are cultivating on the Hughs place, near Prentiss, recently imported direct from
Hong Knog, a lot of Chinese, sixteen in number, with whom as laborers, they are
well pleased."2 1 By 1 880, the US census listed approximately fifty-one Chinese
in Mississippi. In 1 900, this number had grown to 1 83 and in 1 920, to 322. The
majority of these Chinese came from the "Sze Yap or Four Counties district
southwest of Canton in South China . . . . "22
The "Redemption" of the Southern states by the planter class and the
implementation of the old social relations of black and white, coupled with the
infamous "Mississippi Plan of 1 890" (which led to the rise of de jure Jim Crow),
left the Chinese as the odd man out. However, coming from an area of China with
strong entrepreneurial values, these Chinese began to successfully carve out a
niche between black and white in both the social and economic structures of the
"New South." Because of the racist aversion to doing business with "Negroes,"
the Chinese were able to develop and dominate the grocery store business that
sold commodities to blacks. Other ethnics, Italians and Jews, were also permitted
to carve out their niche in selling to the blacks. Referring to this aversion , one
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white businessman said of whites who have stores oriented to selling to blacks,
"Nobody condemns them for it, but we don ' t invite 'em to our homes and our
social life . . . . "23 Another similar comment was: "Occasionally you find a white
merchant down there, but they ' re usually either a dago or a Jew."24 Another
reason why the Chinese were able to establish and dominate the trade with
"Negroes" was because they specified their market by locating in black areas and
they interacted with their consumers with courtesy and respect. As one black
customer stated, "They [Chinese grocers] don 't worry the hell out of you about
saying 'Mr. ' or anything."25
As these Chinese businessmen prospered, by frugal self-denial, they began to
build communities by smuggling in Chinese women, which was against US
immigration law, by importing "merchant wives," which was legal, or by
cohabitating with a "negro woman." It is interesting that Mrs . Gong Lum was
described as an educated lady from Hong Kong-most likely a merchant wife
import.2 6
This small community attempted by their lifestyle, their acceptance of Jim
Crow, and their conversion to Christianity and starting of churches, to elevate
themselves further up the social ladder. But because their status had been
historically predetermined, they would remain at the level of interstitiality or
worse. One Chinese could assert that, "Before 1942, the Chinese had no status
in Mississippi whatever. They were considered on the same status as the Negro .
. . . "27 It is quite obvious that the Mississippi Chinese maintained their existence
as a marginal, isolated community from the whites and did little mixing with
"Negroes" outside of the business relation.
The interstitial marginality was acceptable as long as the Chinese community
was composed of single men or their status did not legally appear to be similar
to the blacks. All this changed when the Chinese community developed a family
base and the community 'S aspirations for its children rose above the status quo.
The Gong Lum case sprang from this changing community and the Chinese
view ofthemselves vis-a-vis the whites and the blacks. In the fall of 1 924, Martha
Gong Lum, daughter of a prosperous Chinese grocer, was first admitted to a
white school and then, at "noon recess," asked to leave by the Rosedale
Consolidated High School trustees. Financially able to hire lawyers from an
established law firm, Mr. Gong Lum, through his lawyers, argued that the Plessy
dictum should be maintained by admitting Martha to the white school since "She
is not a member of the colored race nor is she of mixed blood . . . "2 8 and because
the state of Mississippi had not established a school for Chinese children under
the separate but equal dictum. Victorious at the circuit court level, the Gong
Lums and their lawyers had to face the school trustees ' appeal to the state
supreme court, where they lost. The Mississippi Supreme Court stated
categorically that "Chinese are not white and must fall under the heading, colored
races."2 9 The Court relegated Martha to the separate but unequal school for
"Negroes."
On appeal to the US Supreme Court, the Gong Lum lawyers took an ingenious
tack in their argument. Recognizing the convergence of law, race, and ethnicity,
the lawyers used the logic of the racialistic legal discourse that the US Supreme
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Court had developed since the Slaughter House Cases. Their arguments bring
validity to critical legal theory in several ways but, by the mere fact that Mr. Gong
Lum saw law as partially unjust, reject other assumptions of the theory. The
lawyers asserted that the whites make the law in their image and interest. The
image is the white supremacist world view, and their interest is the maintenance
of their racial domination, in part by establishing superior schools for whites and
inferior schools for blacks. The lawyers then argued that the Chinese should be
included in the social order at a level commensurate with their non-Negro status
and their economic level. The lawyers argued that "If there is danger in the
association [with Negroes] , it is a danger from which one race is entitled to
protection just the same as another. . . . The white race creates for itself a privilege
that it denies to other races; exposes the children of their races to risk and dangers
to which it would not expose its own children. This is discrimination. "30 This was
an intriguing argument that came close to validating Gramscian hegemony
theory in accepting white supremacist assumptions about legal relationships;
however, the Court rejected this argument and sent a non-hegemonic message to
the Gong Lums: If you live in the South, then you fall under the Mississippi
"policy of the lawmakers . . . to preserve the white schools for members of the
Caucasian race alone."
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Taft referred to other post-Compromise
of 1 877 cases. The Court cited over twenty state and federal cases beginning in
1 849 and concluding in 1 896 that upheld the power of the states to impose
various types of segregation on the "colored races." Obviously peeved or just
plain bored with such cases in controversy, he noted,
Were this a new question, it would call for very full argument
and consideration, but we think that it is the same question
which has many times decided to be within the constitutional
power of the state legislature to settle without intervention of
the federal courts under the Federal Constitution.
What is most intriguing about Taft ' s reasoning is that he attempted to support
this entire racialistic artifice by analogous logic. He cited the 1849 case of
Roberts v. City of Boston, which upheld the separation of colored and white
schools. Taft inferred that if white Northerners, the supposed friends of the
"Negro," can rightly segregate them, then why not his "enemies"? Taft noted:
Similar laws have been enacted by Congress under its general
power of legislation over the District of Columbia as well as
by the legislatures of many of the States, and have been
generally, if not unifornlly, sustained by the Courts . . .
Furthermore, Taft stated that these cases
arose, it is true, over the establishment of separate schools as
between white pupils and black pupils, but we can not think
that the question is any different or that any different result can
be reached, assuming the cases above cited to be rightly
decided, where the issue is as between white pupils and the
pupils of the yellow races.
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In referring to P/essy as one of those cases rightly decided, Chief Justice Taft
was promoting the majority decision in Plessy that
every exercise of the police power must be reasonable and
extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the
promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or
oppression of a particular class.
Neither Justice Henry B illings Brown in 1896 nor Taft in 1927 understood the
obvious, as stated by Plessy's lone dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan, "that
the statute in question had its origin in the purpose . . . to exclude colored people.
. . . " Mr. Gong Lum ' s lawyers affirmed Harlan' s correct perception by emphasizing
the "annoyance or oppression" was aimed directly at Chinese American citizens.
As for equal facilities, the Taft Court had to just look at the material
underpinnings on which the statute rested to see the vast and deep inferiority of
"Negro" schools. Separate but unequal schooling was reflected in the disparity
in expenditures the school board allotted for white versus colored schools. As
early as 1912, Southern states were spending less than $2.00 per colored student
while spending around $15.00 per white student.3!
The Taft Court continued by laying to rest the issues of federalism by citing
Harlan ' s decision in Cumming v. Richmond County Board ofEducation.32 This
was a case concerning the power of a local school board to close down a colored
school, because of a budget shortfall, while maintaining a school for white
children. Harlan decided
the education of the people in schools maintained by state
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and any
interference on the part of Federal authority with the
management of such schools can not be justified . . . .
In citing this case, the Court argued that "the right and power of the state to
regulate the method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense
is clear." The Taft Court ' s insistence on supporting local autonomy at the
expense of black rights was certainly in keeping with the infamous Compromise
of 1877. Settling the "Negro Question" was more important than giving the
"brown, yellow or black races" a truly equal protection of the laws.
By affirming the Mississippi Supreme Court ' s decision, the Taft Court agreed
that Mr. Gong Lum could "educate his child in a private school if he so desires.
But the plaintiff is not entitled to attend a white public school." This agreement
reveals how legal ideological discourse affirms a certain reality-that Chinese
grocers had achieved a comfortable class status which was so recognized by the
Court ' s decision. The discourse then attempts to obscure the inequality of "free
choice" by not addressing the substantive quality of such private schools and the
social stigma attached. As Justice Brown noted in Plessy, if whites think that the
colored races are inferior and should be segregated, then "law cannot change
custom." Obviously, Brown could not, nor would not, concede that legal
legitimacy would help mold the consciousness of segregationist whites to make
them feel that they were doing the right thing. The law ' s ideology could and did
legitimize the material interests , as expressed via the structure of separate
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schools, of those whites who supplicated ever so successfully before the US
Supreme Court.
However, with the loss of this case, and in refutation of the theory of
hegemony, the Gong Lums and other Chinese families either left the state of
Mississippi or the South entirely. Others brought in Chinese teachers from
California and started their own "resistance school" (Chinese B aptist Mission
S chool). The county assisted by hiring two white school teachers to aid in this
separation)3 Social tensions remained high and bitterness continued for many
years. The decision did not assure the Mississippi Chinese that their interest
should be subordinated to the "collective judgments" of white society. The
ideological discourse of law did not convince the Chinese that social antagonism
would lessen. The Chinese felt antagonism toward them would be increased as
they were lumped into a group that had received the brunt of legalized violence.
This examination of Gong Lum v. Rice reveals what is promising about
critical legal theory and also its dead end when it is applied to racialistic law as
it developed in this country between 1872 and 1927. Federalism and equal
protection of the laws as legal ideological constructs were contoured to meet the
exigencies of race and politics during this period. Racism as a dominant cultural
and political world view of both Northern and Southern ruling classes was
expressed through legal doctrine to legitimize and support the material interest
of these classes. The North was able to set aside the volatile "Negro Question"
which had so enthralled and bogged down national political direction since the
Civil War. Northern interest in developing a strong unified national economy
and the S outhern need to regain control over a disenchanted and radicalized labor
force led to the Compromise of 1877. This Compromise received a legal and
Constitutional salutation in a series of Supreme Court cases that intertwined legal
discourse and racism. This salutation culminated in the "separate but equal"
doctrine in 1896.
The promise of critical legal theory is somewhat confirmed if one sees the
consensus of racism structuring white mass consciousness and social relations
while obscuring the inherent inequality of these relations to the whites themselves.
The dead end, of course, is that the inequality of legal doctrine was obvious to
the various racial minorities who challenged racialistic law. One can also argue
the promise of hegemonic theory by seeing that these racial minorities used law,
specifically separate but equal doctrine, to support their legal complaint.
The flaw in this line of thinking is that Mr. Gong Lum, et aI. , were merely
using the doctrine tactically and never permitted its verbal "fig-leaves" to
obscure the reality of racial discrimination and oppression as they assessed their
own material condition and the broader set of social relations in the "New South."
Critical legal theory can help legal scholars in their examination of American
legal history. This paper demonstrates that the theory has to be severely adjusted
when it is applied to the history of race relations law. American law and its
brethren, Judge Lynch and Lynch Law, have consistently revealed to America ' s
racial minorities the illegitimacy of law, its ideologies offaimess and justice, and
its functionaries. Brown v. Board of Education,34 which overturned Gong Lum ,
is remembered today, by many critics, as the first time that the Supreme Court
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had recognized a constitutional right and then denied it "with all deliberate
speed." The 199 1 confirmation of African American conservative Clarence
Thomas to the Supreme Court will not ensure a different type of fairness, nor
justice, in the legal remedies held out to minorities. Inversely, his presence, for
those who are very much ahistorical, will legitimate the illusion of justice which
is legal hegemony 's purpose. The appeal for legal relief by racial minorities has
more to do with their understanding of the law 's coercive dimension if they take
their grievances to the "proverbial" streets than with a belief by these minorities
that the oracle of law is magical, objectively ritualistic, and serves truth. Racially
oppressed minorities, more so than other Americans, understood and understand
the ideological masks and contradictions inherent in the law, as expressed by
O.W. Holmes who suggested, in his Common Law ( 1880), that the felt necessi
ties of the time or the prejudices of men determined the paths of law rather than
syllogistic logic.35 The Gong Lum v. Rice decision reflects this observation and,
in its insistence on a racialistic, federally protected "equality," reveals a much
deeper revelation as expressed by Anatole France :
The law in its majestic impartiality forbids rich and poor alike
to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets , and steal bread .36
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Critique
Law in the United States may of course be viewed through a number of
different perspectives. Over the past several decades,racial minorities have used
litigation and legislation to reform institutional policies and practices,and this
has given impetus to perspectives of law as a significant tool of constructive
social change. While such frameworks have validity,Malik Simba's paper is a
relevant reminder of the ideological and coercive dimensions of law and of its
long history as a means of oppressing racial minorities.
Simba presents critical legal theory as a fairly straightforward perspective
that sees law as an ideological form which reflects the material interests of the
dominant classes and helps structure society and its material base but at the same
time obscuring this and performing a hegemonic function to lessen social
antagonisms. Simba effectively uses this interpretation to describe the role of law
in solidifying white supremacy in the post- Civil War South and to examine the
theory 's utility through the case of Gong Lum v. Rice.
Critical legal theory clearly has promise for the historical analysis of race
relations law,though its basic concepts have broad meanings and implications
and may require some specification before they can be applied to other situations.
Also,as Simba correctly points out,critical legal theory has a serious shortcom
ing. Legal institutions have not functioned to veil inequality and injustice from
racial minorities. Therefore,adjustments to critical theory must be made before
this perspective can be applied to other circumstances.
Simba argues that, by the time of the Gong Lum case, the Chinese in
Mississippi had achieved a marginal,interstitial status between the blacks and
the whites. This is an area that requires further analysis because it may reveal
another problem with critical legal theory. Sociologist Robert Quan contends
that the Chinese were moving toward the creation of a triracial society. At the
time of the Gong Lum case, they had achieved the first steps in this process
through the immigration of wives and intact families, their conversion to
Christianity,and the economic foundation of their grocery stores. This process
was aided by the whites, who, for example, taught the Chinese the English
language,American values,and Southern Baptist religion. 1 More needs to be
known about the extent of white assistance and the nature of the emerging
triracial society. But the whites clearly benefited from the latter. The triracial
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